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Abstract This paper addresses the ambiguity of comparatives that contain a
permission-related existential modal in their than-clause. For example, given the
context that the interval of permitted speed is between 35 and 50 mph, the sentence
Lucinda is driving less fast than allowed is ambiguous between two readings: (i) her
speed is below the minimum (i.e., 35 mph); (ii) her speed is below the maximum
(i.e., 50 mph). Previously, this ambiguity has been attributed to either the scopal
interaction between a negation element and a modal (Heim 2006a) or the optional
application of a silent operator (Crnicˇ 2017). Here we show that these two lines
of accounts under- or over-generate. Instead, we propose that the source of this
ambiguity is located in the ambiguous answerhood for wh-questions corresponding
to this kind of than-clauses (e.g., how fast is Lucinda allowed to drive). The current
proposal consists of three parts. First, based on Zhang & Ling 2015, 2017a,b, we
adopt a generalized interval-arithmetic-based recipe for computing the semantics
of comparatives. Second, the semantics of than-clauses is considered equal to that
of short answers to corresponding wh-questions. Third, since the use of existential
priority modals in wh-questions leads to the ‘mention-some/mention-all’ ambiguity
for answerhood, we propose that this ambiguity projects in further derivation and
leads to the two readings for comparatives like the Lucinda sentence.
Keywords: clausal comparatives, interval arithmetic, permission-related modals, answer-
hood for wh-questions, mention-some/mention-all ambiguity, existential priority modals
1 Introduction
It has been noticed for decades (since Seuren 1979) that some comparatives are
ambiguous. For example, as illustrated in (1), given this context in which the
permissible speed ranges from 35 mph to 50 mph, sentence (1) has two readings.
One interpretation is that Lucinda is driving below the required minimum
speed, which suggests that Lucinda’s speed is illegal (see (1a) – the ‘< MIN’
reading). The other interpretation is that Lucinda is driving below the speed limit,
which suggests that Lucinda’s speed is legal (see (1b) – the ‘< MAX’ reading).
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(1) CONTEXT: This highway has a required minimum speed of 35 mph and a
speed limit of 50 mph.
Lucinda is driving less fast than allowed. Lucinda sentence
a. ‘< MIN’ reading ; Lucinda’s speed is illegal.
Lucinda is driving below the required minimum speed (i.e., 35 mph).
b. ‘< MAX’ reading ; Lucinda’s speed is legal.
Lucinda is driving below the speed limit (i.e., 50 mph).
There are two elements noticeable about the Lucinda example in (1). First, this
is a less-than comparative, not a more-than comparative. Second, its than-clause
contains a permission-related existential modal: allowed. Therefore, these elements
suggest several potential ways to locate the source of ambiguity for sentence (1).
Since the work of Rullmann (1995), several studies (e.g., Heim 2006a; Büring
2007a,b) have focused on the differences between more-than and less-than com-
paratives. In particular, Heim (2006a) decomposes less into a negation element
(i.e., little) and a comparative morpheme (i.e., -er) and attributes the ambiguity of
sentence (1) to the scopal interaction within its than-clause.
Alternatively, based on a degree-plurality-based approach to the semantics of
comparatives (Beck 2010, 2013, 2014; Dotlacˇil & Nouwen 2016), Crnicˇ (2017)
attributes the ambiguity of sentence (1) to the optional application of a silent operator.
In addition to these two approaches, relevant data have been discussed by Meier
(2002), Heim (2006b), Krasikova (2008, 2011), Beck (2010, 2013), and Alrenga &
Kennedy (2014), and inferential properties of predicates as well as pragmatic factors
have also been taken into consideration (see Beck & Rullmann 1999; Beck 2013).
The goal of this paper is to point out a new source of ambiguity: the ‘mention-
some/mention-all’ ambiguity in answering wh-questions containing existential pri-
ority modals (see Fox 2013, 2016; Xiang 2016; Dayal 2016).
In a nutshell, we consider the semantics of a than-clause equal to that of the
short answer to the wh-question corresponding to its than-clause, and thus, when the
answerhood for this wh-question is ambiguous due to the use of existential priority
modals, this ambiguity projects in further derivation.
In the following, Section 2 presents two representative existing accounts (Heim
2006a and Crnicˇ 2017) and their limitations. Section 3 presents more data to show
the general pattern of ambiguous and unambiguous comparatives. Our proposal in
Section 4 includes three parts: a generalized interval-arithmetic-based recipe for
the semantics of comparatives (Section 4.1), an answerhood-based view for the
semantics of than-clauses (Section 4.2), and an account that attributes the ambiguity
of ‘mention-some/mention-all’ answerhood to the use of existential priority modals
(Section 4.3). Section 5 assembles these parts and accounts for the ambiguity of the
Lucinda example. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Previous accounts and their limitations
2.1 Heim’s (2006a) account for the ambiguity of less-than comparatives
Heim (2006a) attributes the ambiguity of sentence (1) to the scopal interaction
between little (i.e., a negation element) and a modal within the than-clause.
In this analysis, as shown in (2), less is considered composed of two parts: little
and comparative morpheme more/-er. Heim (2006a) analyzes little as an operator
that basically works like a negation element: it takes a certain degree (of type d) as
input and returns a degree generalized quantifier (see (3)).
(2) less = little + more/-er
(3) [[littleHeim (2006a)]]〈d,〈dt,t〉〉
def
= λdd.λP〈dt〉.P(d) = 0 ≈ negation
Therefore, in Heim’s (2006a) analysis for sentence (1), -er in the matrix clause
relates two negated degree properties (see (6)): the comparative standard (which is
expressed by the than-clause) and the comparative subject (i.e., the set of speeds
that Lucinda does not reach – (Speed@(Lucinda),+∞)). As shown in (7), the
comparative standard is ambiguous between (i) the set of speeds Lucinda is allowed
not to reach, which leads to the ‘< MIN’ reading (see (7a)), and (ii) the set of speeds
Lucinda is not allowed to reach, which leads to the ‘< MAX’ reading (see (7b)).
(4) [[fastHeim (2006a)]]〈d,et〉
def
= λdd.λxe.Speed〈ed〉(x)≥ d
(5) [[more/-erHeim (2006a)]]〈dt,〈dt,t〉〉
def
= λP〈dt〉.λQ〈dt〉.P⊂ Q
(6) Heim’s (2006a) LF for the matrix clause of (1):
Lucinda is driving [[-er than allowed] little] fast
[-er than-clause]〈dt,t〉 [λd1.[[d1 little〈d,〈dt,t〉〉]〈dt,t〉 [λd2.Lu is driving d2 fast]]]
(7) The scopal interaction between allowed and little within the than-clause:
Heim’s (2006a) LF for the than-clause of (1):
than (Lucinda is) allowed (to drive [... little] fast)
a. LF for the than-clause with ‘allowed > little’:
λd3. allowed [[d3 little〈d,〈dt,t〉〉]〈dt,t〉 [λd4. Lucinda is to drive d4 fast]]; the set of speed degrees that Lucinda is allowed not to reach.
(the required min.,+∞)⊂ (Speed@(Lucinda),+∞) ‘< MIN’ reading
b. LF for the than-clause with ‘little > allowed’:
λd3. [[d3 little〈d,〈dt,t〉〉]〈dt,t〉 [λd4. Lucinda is allowed to drive d4 fast]]; the set of speed degrees that Lucinda is not allowed to reach.
(the speed limit,+∞)⊂ (Speed@(Lucinda),+∞) ‘< MAX’ reading
Crucially, this account is based on the presence of little in sentence (1). However,
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as noted by Meier (2002), Heim (2006b), Krasikova (2008, 2011), and Alrenga &
Kennedy (2014), not only less-than comparatives but also more-than comparatives
can be ambiguous, as illustrated in (8). It is also worth noting that sentences in (8)
use obligation-related universal modals. Under the given context, sentences in (8)
all have two readings: the ‘> MAX’ reading (see (9a)) and the ‘> MIN’ reading (see
(9b)). According to Alrenga & Kennedy (2014), even though the ‘> MIN’ reading is
more salient, the ‘> MAX’ reading is still marginally available.
(8) CONTEXT: Chuck wants to be a fighter pilot. Air Force regulations require
all pilots to be between 5′4′′ and 6′5′′ tall.
a. Chuck is taller than he needs to be.
b. Chuck is taller than he has to be.
c. Chuck is taller than he is required to be.
(9) The ambiguity of (8a–c):
a. ‘> MAX’ reading: Chuck is taller than the upper bound (i.e., 6′5′′).
b. ‘> MIN’ reading: Chuck is taller than the lower bound (i.e., 5′4′′).
The existence of ambiguous more-than comparatives suggests that an account
that relies on the use of less (or little) under-generates attested patterns.
2.2 Crnicˇ’s (2017) account within a degree-plurality-based framework
For an alternative account, Crnicˇ (2017) attributes the ambiguity of sentence (1) to
the optional application of a silent operator.
Crnicˇ (2017) adopts the degree-plurality-based framework developed by Beck
(2010, 2013, 2014) and Dotlacˇil & Nouwen (2016). Within this framework, the
domain of degrees is similar to the domain of entities in that there are not only
atomic degrees like 50 mph, 6′5′′, but also degree pluralities like 50 mph ⊕ 51 mph,
etc. The semantics of than-clauses is analyzed as a potentially plural degree.
Crnicˇ (2017) uses two silent operators: SHIFT and M-INF. Essentially, the
application of SHIFT changes the ‘at least’ reading of a degree expression (see (10))
into an ‘exactly’ reading (see (11), (12)). M-INF is borrowed from Beck (2014): it
applies to a set of degrees to generate the sum of the most informative degrees in
this set. Obviously, the output of M-INF is potentially a degree plurality.
(10) [[fastCrnicˇ (2017)]]〈d,et〉
def
= λdd.λxe.Speed〈ed〉(x)≥ d = (4)
(11) [[SHIFT]]〈d,〈〈d,et〉,et〉〉
def
= λdd.λM〈d,et〉λxe.max(λd′.M(d′)(x))≤part d
(12) [[[SHIFT d] fast] x]
⇔max(λd′.Speed(x)≥ d′)≤part d ; an ‘exactly’ interpretation
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(13) [[M-INF]]〈dt,d〉1
def
= λD〈dt〉.⊕{d|D(d)∧¬∃d′(D(d′)∧d 6= d′∧D(d′)>more informative D(d))}
i.e., M-INF takes a degree property D as input and returns the sum of any
atomic degree d such that (i) the property D holds for d and (ii) there is no
other d′ that makes D(d′) more informative than D(d).
Thus, when a than-clause does not denote an atomic degree, there are two
possibilities: (i) without the application of SHIFT, M-INF returns the maximum
value of all relevant degrees; (ii) with the application of SHIFT, M-INF returns the
sum of all relevant degrees. For a more-than comparative, as shown in (14)–(17),
Lucinda’s actual speed is compared either with the maximally allowed degree ‘50
mph’ (see (15a)) or each atomic degree in the sum ‘35 mph ⊕...⊕ 50 mph’ (see
(15b)). Thus, no matter whether SHIFT applies or not, the more-than comparative
(14) has an unambiguous ‘> MAX’ reading. However, for a less-than comparative,
these two options lead to the ‘< MAX’ and ‘< MIN’ readings respectively (see (18)).
(14) CONTEXT: the permissible speed ranges from 35 mph to 50 mph.
Lucinda is driving faster than allowed. Unambiguous: ‘> MAX’ reading
(15) Crnicˇ’s (2017) LF for the than-clause of (14) / the Lucinda example in (1):
a. M-INF [λd. Lucinda is allowed to drive d fast]
[[M-INF]]({d|3w(Speedw(Lucinda)≥ d)}) = 50 mph
b. M-INF [λd. Lucinda is allowed to drive [SHIFT d] fast]
[[M-INF]]({d|3w(max(λd′.M(d′)(x))≤part d)})
= 35 mph ⊕...⊕ 50 mph
(16) a. [[more/-erCrnicˇ (2017)]]〈d,dt〉
def
= λdd.λd′d.d
′ > d
b. [[lessCrnicˇ (2017)]]〈d,dt〉
def
= λdd.λd′d.d > d
′
(17) d > d′ iff for all atomic degrees datom, d′atom,
if datom ≤part d and d′atom ≤part d′, then datom > datom.
(18) Crnicˇ’s (2017) LF for the Luncinda example in (1):
less [than-clause] [M-INF [λd′. Lucinda is driving d′ fast]]
a. Based on (15a), 50 mph > Speed@(Lucinda). ; ‘< MAX’ reading
b. Based on (15b), 35 mph > Speed@(Lucinda). ; ‘< MIN’ reading
However, as already noticed by Crnicˇ (2017), when a more-than comparative
contains a universal (modal or nominal) quantifier in its than-clause, it is predicted
to be ambiguous between a ‘> MIN’ and a ‘> MAX’ reading. However, as shown in
(19), this prediction is not borne out, and only the a ‘> MAX’ reading is attested.
1 This operator is named MAX by Crnicˇ (2017). We call it M-INF to avoid confusion.
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(19) Lucinda is driving faster than every boy is. unambiguous
a. [[M-INF [λd. every boy is driving d fast]]]:
the maximum speed such that every boy reaches; Lucinda is faster than the slowest boy is. unattested reading
b. [[M-INF [λd. every boy is driving [SHIFT d] fast]]]:
the sum of each boy’s speed; Lucinda is faster than the fastest boy is. available reading
In sum, the accounts of Heim (2006a) and Crnicˇ (2017) under- or over-generate,
suggesting that the ambiguity of comparatives like the Lucinda example is, in
general, not due to the direction of inequality or the mere presence of some quantifier
or modal that makes their than-clause fail to denote an atomic degree.
3 More empirical observations
Here we show that comparatives are, in general, unambiguous, and the pattern for
MAX- or MIN-related readings is uniform. The only exception comes with the use of
deontic modals (especially permission-related existential modals) in than-clauses.
As shown in (21–24), for both more-than and less-than comparatives, when
comparatives contain in their than-clause universal nominal quantifiers (see (21)),
universal epistemic modals (see (22)), existential nominal quantifiers (see (23)),
or existential epistemic modals (see (24)), these sentences are all unambiguous.
Moreover, when a than-clauses denotes a range of values, its reading follows the
generalization in (20), which is basically consistent with Beck’s (2013) findings.
(20) When a than-clause denotes a range of values (see (21), (22), and (24)),
a. A more-than comparative always has a ‘> MAX’ reading;
b. A less-than comparative always has a ‘< MIN’ reading.
(21) Universal nominal quantifier: every
a. John is taller than every girl is. X> MAX, # > MIN
b. John is less tall than every girl is. # < MAX,X< MIN
(22) Universal epistemic modal: be supposed to
CONTEXT: Air Force regulations require all pilots to be between 5′4′′ and
6′5′′ tall. John, a fighter pilot, meets the requirement, but we doubt this.
a. John looks taller than he is supposed to be. X> MAX, # > MIN
b. John looks less tall than he is supposed to be. # < MAX,X< MIN
(23) Existential nominal quantifier: some
a. John is taller than some girls are. # > MAX,X> MIN
b. John is less tall than some girls are. X< MAX, # < MIN
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(24) Existential epistemic modal: possible
CONTEXT: The range of sound frequencies audible to humans has an upper
and a lower bound.
a. The call of these birds is higher than it is possible for us to hear.
X> MAX, # > MIN
b. This sound is less high than it is possible for us to hear.
# < MAX, X< MIN
Here we turn to comparatives with deontic modals in their than-clause that ad-
dress permission or obligation. As already shown in (1) and (8), comparatives of the
patterns (i) ‘less-than + permission-related existential modals’ or (ii) ‘more-than
+ obligation-related universal modals’ are ambiguous. The naturally occurring
examples shown in (25) and (26) suggest that both ‘> MIN’ and ‘> MAX’ readings
can be available for more-than comparatives with permission-related existen-
tial modals, though if minimally is omitted, the ‘> MIN’ reading is not obvious.2
However, for less-than comparatives with obligation-related universal modals, as
shown in (27), it seems that they only have an unambiguous ‘< MIN’ reading.
(25) CONTEXT: Chip sets with low heat release may come with small heat sinks,
and their cooling efficiency will still be sufficient owing to more intensive
heat exchange because of the increased temperature difference. (link)
Northbridge has a larger heat sink than minimally allowed. X > MIN
(26) It is advisable that a child stays in the seat of group 1 as long as possible,
that is until he or she reaches the mass bigger than maximally allowed for
this group of seats. (link) X > MAX
(27) CONTEXT: All pilots are required to be between 5′4′′ and 6′5′′ tall.
Chuck is less tall than he needs / has to be. # < MAX,X< MIN
Furthermore, as (28) shows, once an exhaustifier (such as any) is added into
the than-clause of comparatives with permission-related existential modals, the
resultant sentences are no longer ambiguous and follow the generalization in (20). In
contrast, adding an exhaustifier into comparatives with obligation-related universal
modals does not change the pattern of judgments shown in (8) and (27): the more-
than comparative (29a) is marginally ambiguous with a dispreferred ‘> MAX’
reading and the less-than comparative (29b) has an unambiguous ‘< MIN’ reading.3
2 Beck (2013) claims that the ‘> MIN’ reading is most salient for than-clauses containing sufficient:
e.g., we have more flour than sufficient. This can follow naturally from studies that analyze sufficient
as minimally allowed (see Meier 2003; c.f. Hacquard 2005, 2006; Zhang 2017).
3 In fact, this follows naturally from the claim that exhausifiers like any have a universal force (see,
e.g., Dayal 2004; Xiang 2016). (Notice that obligation-related modals have also a universal force.)
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Existential modal (allowed) Universal modal (required)
more than (25), (26): X> MAX, X> MIN (8): X? > MAX, X> MIN
less than (1): X< MAX, X< MIN (27): # < MAX, X< MIN
allowed + exhaustifier required + exhaustifier
more than (28a): X> MAX, # > MIN (29a): X? > MAX, X> MIN
less than (28a): # < MAX,X< MIN (29b): # < MAX, X< MIN
Table 1 Available readings for comparatives with deontic modals.
(28) CONTEXT: This highway has a required minimum speed of 35 mph and a
speed limit of 50 mph.
a. Bill is driving faster than anyone is allowed to. X> MAX, # > MIN
b. Bill is driving less fast than anyone is allowed to. # < MAX,X< MIN
(29) CONTEXT: All pilots are required to be between 5′4′′ and 6′5′′ tall.
a. Chuck is taller than anyone is required to be. X? > MAX,X> MIN
b. Chuck is less tall than anyone is required to be. # < MAX, X< MIN
Table 1 summarizes the judgments for comparatives with deontic modals. There
are two points worth noting here. First, overall, the generalization in (20) is still
compatible with comparatives with deontic modals. Second, it seems that (i) for those
using obligation-related universal modals, the MAX-related reading is somehow
disfavored, while (ii) for those using permission-related existential modals, the
MIN-related reading is sometimes non-obvious (i.e., not unattested). Thus, in general,
comparatives with permission-related modals are more subject to ambiguity than
comparatives with obligation-related modals, and the original Lucinda example
illustrates exactly the most typical type of ambiguous comparatives.
Therefore, the ambiguity of comparatives is crucially related to the use of
permission-related modals, and this is obviously reminiscent of another kind of
ambiguity in natural language: the mention-some/mention-all ambiguity of an-
swerhood for certain wh-questions. As pointed out by Fox (2013, 2016), Xiang
(2016), and Dayal (2016), the hallmark of this mention-some/mention-all ambiguity
is exactly the use of existential priority modals in wh-question (and the absence of
exhaustifiers). In the following, we develop an analysis following this line.
4 Proposal
Our current proposal is composed of three parts. First, with an interval-arithmetic-
based recipe, we show how the maximum and minimum values of a comparative
standard (i.e., what is expressed by a than-clause) always contribute to the semantics
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of comparatives in a uniform way, and thus comparatives are in principle unambigu-
ous. Next, we draw a connection between the semantics of than-clauses and that
of short answers to corresponding wh-questions and show that they are equivalent.
Therefore, whether a comparative is ambiguous depends solely on whether the
wh-question corresponding to its than-clause has ambiguous answerhood. Finally,
we show that the use of existential priority modals leads to ambiguous answerhood.
4.1 The semantics of comparatives: An interval-arithmetic-based approach
A generalized interval-arithmetic-based recipe for computing the semantics of com-
paratives has been developed by Zhang & Ling (2015, 2017a,b), which characterizes
in a precise and natural way how the maximum and minimum values of compara-
tive standards and differentials contribute to the truth condition of comparatives.4
This interval-arithmetic-based recipe is based on two basic ideas. First, a compar-
ative sentence essentially denotes a relation among three degree-related expressions:
the comparative subject, the comparative standard, and the differential. For
example, for the sentence John is taller than Mary is, here the comparative subject is
John’s height (e.g., the position that marks ‘6′’ on the scale of height), the compara-
tive standard is Mary’s height (e.g., the position that marks ‘5′’ on the same scale),
and the differential is the distance between John’s and Mary’s position on this scale.5
Notice that the positions (i.e., the comparative standard and the comparative subject)
and the distance between them are not the same kind of objects. This becomes
evident when we consider the temporal scale: 5:00 and 6:00 are two positions on the
temporal scale, while the distance between them is 1 hour, not 1:00.
Second, positions on a scale don’t have to be represented by points, and we adopt
a generalized view for positions and represent them as intervals. Intervals can be
considered somewhat blurred points: an interval is a range of possible values so
that it marks a position in a not-so-precise way. Therefore, an interval is actually a
convex set of points,6 and for a convex set {x|a≤ x≤ b} , we can write it as [a,b].7
As shown in (30), operations on two intervals result in the largest possible range.
4 The differences between this recipe and the interval-based approach of Schwarzchild & Wilkinson
(2002) as well as the degree-plurality-based approach developed by Beck (2014) and Dotlacˇil &
Nouwen (2016) are discussed in Zhang & Ling 2015, 2017b.
5 This distance-based ontology for the semantics of comparatives is different from the classical
threshold-exceeding view (see Von Stechow 1984; Schwarzschild 2008; etc), and the differences
between these two views are discussed in Zhang & Ling 2015, 2017b.
6 A convex totally ordered set is a totally ordered set P such that for any elements a and b in the set, if
a≤ b, then any element x such that a≤ x ≤ b is also in the set. E.g., {x|x > 0} and {x|4≤ x < 8}
are convex sets, while sets such as {x|x≤ 5∨ x > 8} are not convex.
7 We use square brackets ‘[’ and ‘]’ to mean closed upper and lower bounds and parentheses ‘(’ and ‘)’
to mean open upper and lower bounds.
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Figure 1 The subtraction between two intervals
(30) Operations on two intervals [x1,x2] and [y1,y2]: (see Moore 1979)
min([x1,x2]〈OP〉[y1,y2]) = min(x1〈OP〉y1,x1〈OP〉y2,x2〈OP〉y1,x2〈OP〉y2)
max([x1,x2]〈OP〉[y1,y2]) = max(x1〈OP〉y1,x1〈OP〉y2,x2〈OP〉y1,x2〈OP〉y2)
Based on (30), the definition of the subtraction between two intervals is shown
in (31) and illustrated in Figure 1. Obviously, the difference between two intervals
[x1,x2] and [y1,y2] is also an interval.
(31) Interval subtraction: [y1,y2]− [x1,x2] = [y1− x2,y2− x1] (See Figure 1)
Therefore, as shown in (32), for a comparative sentence, we can analyze the
three degree-related expressions all as intervals, and the relation between these three
intervals follows the rule of interval subtraction in (31). Thus, given the values
of the differential and the comparative standard, we can also compute the value
of the comparative subject, as shown in (33). Notice that the upper bound of the
comparative subject is computed from the lower bound of the comparative standard
and the upper bound of the differential (see (33a)), while the lower bound of the
comparative subject is computed from the upper bound of the comparative standard
and the lower bound of the differential (see (33b)).
(32) a. differentialupper-bound ; (33a)
= comparative-subjectupper-bound− comparative-standardlower-bound
b. differentiallower-boud ; (33b)
= comparative-subjectlower-bound− comparative-standardupper-bound
(33) a. comparative-subjectupper-bound
= comparative-standardlower-bound+ differentialupper-bound
b. comparative-subjectlower-boud
= comparative-standardupper-bound+ differentiallower-boud
We analyze the semantics of gradable adjectives as relations between intervals
(of type 〈dt〉) and entities (of type e). As shown in (34), x is situated within the
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interval I on a relevant scale. For the absolute use of gradable adjectives, the interval
argument is a context-dependent interval IC (see (34a)), which is the shorthand for
‘the context-dependent interval such that it is from the lower to the upper bound of
being tall for a relevant comparison class’. In (34b), ‘6′’ can be interpreted either
as a singleton set for an ‘exactly’ reading (see (34b-i)) or an interval with 6′ as its
lower bound for an ‘at least’ reading (see (34b-ii)).
(34) [[tall]]〈dt,et〉
def
= λ I〈dt〉.λxe.Height(x)⊆ I
a. [[John is tall]]⇔ Height(John)⊆ IC
b. (i) [[John is 6′ tall]]⇔ Height(John)⊆ [6′,6′] ‘exactly’ reading
(ii) [[John is 6′ tall]]⇔ Height(John)⊆ [6′,+∞) ‘at least’ reading
For a comparative sentence, we analyze the comparative morpheme more/-er
as the default differential: (0,+∞), which represents a positive interval allowing
for the most possibilities (see (35)).8 Little changes the polarity of an interval (see
(36)) so that in a less-than comparative, the default differential less means (−∞,0),
i.e., a negative interval allowing for the most possibilities (see (37)). Obviously, the
direction of inequality is shifted when the polarity of the differential is altered.
(35) [[more/-er]]〈dt〉
def
= (0,+∞)
(36) [[little]]〈dt,dt〉
def
= λ I〈dt〉.[0,0]− I (see Zhang & Ling 2017a)
(37) [[less]]〈dt〉
def
= [[little]][[more/-er]] = (−∞,0)
As shown in (38), [[(th)-an]] takes two intervals as arguments, one serving as
the comparative standard and the other the differential, and returns the interval that
serves as the comparative standard.
(38) [[(th)-an]]〈dt,〈dt,dt〉〉
def
= λ Istdd.λ Idiff.ιI[I− Istdd = Idiff]
Based on the definitions in (34)–(38) and the computation mechanism shown
in (33), the semantic derivation for more-than comparative (39a) and less-than
comparative (39b) is shown in (40). In (40), [[the]] applies to the set of intervals
λ I′.[∀x[boy(x)→ Speed(x)⊆ I′] and returns the most informative interval that in-
cludes every boy’s height (see (41)). The notion of informativeness often depends on
the precision level of measurement in a context. We can write the definite description
[[the]][λ I′.[∀x[boy(x)→Speed(x)⊆ I′]]] as [Ievery-boy’s-height-MIN, Ievery-boy’s-height-MAX].
8 Analyzing the comparative morpheme more/-er as an interval that serves as the default differential is
independently motivated (see Zhang & Ling 2015 as well as Greenberg 2010; Thomas 2010, 2011).
For comparatives with further restriction on differentials, e.g., more than 2 inches taller, or at most 2
inches less tall, see Zhang & Ling 2015, 2017a for a more detailed analysis.
201
Zhang and Ling
(39) a. Lucinda is taller than every boy is.
b. Lucinda is less fast than every boy is.
(40) a. [[(39a)]]⇔Hgt(Lucinda)⊆ ιI[I−[[than every boy is (tall)]] = (0,+∞)]
⇔Hgt(Lu)⊆ ιI[I−[[the]][λ I′.[∀x[boy(x)→Hgt(x)⊆ I′]]]=(0,+∞)]
⇔ Hgt(Lucinda)⊆ (Ievery-boy’s-height-MAX,+∞)
b. [[(39b)]]⇔Hgt(Lucinda)⊆ ιI[I−[[than every boy is (tall)]] = (−∞,0)]
⇔Hgt(Lu)⊆ ιI[I−[[the]][λ I′.[∀x[boy(x)→Hgt(x)⊆ I′]]]=(−∞,0)]
⇔ Hgt(Lucinda)⊆ (−∞, Ievery-boy’s-height-MIN)
(41) [[the]]〈〈dt,t〉,dt〉
def
= λP〈dt,t〉.ιI[P(I)∧¬∃I′ 6= I(P(I′)∧P(I′)>more informative P(I))]
As shown in (40a), without further restriction for differentials, the upper bound
of the differential in a more-than comparative is infinity. Consequently, the upper
bound of the resultant comparative subject is also infinity, and apparently, it seems
that only the lower bound of the comparative subject matters, which is computed
from the upper bound of the comparative standard (plus 0 – the lower bound of the
differential). Therefore, when a than-clause denotes a range of values in a more-than
comparative, we always care about its upper bound, and the ‘> MAX’ reading is
always available (see the generalization in (20) and Table 1).
Similarly, from the derivation in (40b), we can conclude that when a than-clause
denotes a range of values in a less-than comparative, we always care about its lower
bound (which contributes to the upper bound of the comparative subject), and the
‘< MIN’ reading is always available.
The upshot here is that in both more-than and less-than comparatives, the upper
and the lower bound of the comparative standard always contribute to the semantics
of the comparative subject in a uniform way (see (33)). A comparative sentence is
similar to a sentence with cumulative reading (e.g., exactly 3 boys saw exactly 5
movies) in that there is no scope taking among its three degree-related expressions.
4.2 Than-clauses analyzed as short answers to wh-questions
Here we adopt the categorial approach to the semantics of questions and answers
(see Hausser & Zaefferer 1978; Hausser 1983; Von Stechow & Zimmermann 1984;
Ginzburg & Sag 2000; Guerzoni & Sharvit 2007; Krifka 2011; Barker 2016; Xiang
2016; etc). Within this categorial framework, a question denotes a function, and its
short answer denotes the argument such that applying the function to this argument
results in a true proposition, i.e., the long answer, as illustrated in (42).
(42) [[Who came to the party?]] = λxe.x came to the party
a. John. Short answer (or fragment answer)
b. John came to the party. Long answer (or propositional answer)
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As we have shown in (40) (the than-clause is repeated here in (43a)), within the
interval-arithmetic-based analysis for comparatives, the semantics of the than-clause
is derived by applying [[the]] to a set of intervals (here λ I.∀x[boy(x)→ Height(x)⊆
I′]) so that [[the]] picks out the context-dependent, most informative interval that
includes every boy’s height. It is evident that this set of intervals can be considered
a function standing for a wh-question, i.e., how tall is every boy (see (43b)). Thus
the context-dependent, most informative interval (43a) is exactly the short answer
to this wh-question (43b): applying the function to this most informative interval
returns a true proposition. In other words, the semantics of a than-clause and the
short answer to the wh-question corresponding to this than-clause are equivalent.9
(43) a. [[than every boy is (tall)]] = [[the]][λ I.∀x[boy(x)→ Height(x)⊆ I′]]
b. [[how tall is every boy]] = λ I.∀x[boy(x)→ Height(x)⊆ I′]
The example (44) also provides support for an answerhood-based view for than-
clauses. In some English dialects, than-clauses can explicitly contain wh-questions.
(44) % This table is longer than how wide the door is.
Then a worth-noting issue is how to give a short answer to a pair-list wh-question
like how tall is every boy. As illustrated in (45), given this context in which each
of the three girls ate a different kind of fruit, here the wh-question typically needs
a pair-list answer. As shown in (45a), using a conjunctive form yields a sum of
entities, and native speakers of English all judge (45a) as a bad answer under the
given context. In contrast, for many native speakers, using a disjunctive form yields
a much better answer (see (45b)). According to some of our consultants who do not
like (45b), the short answer (45b) eventually leads to a corresponding long answer
with two possible readings, i.e., the ‘OR > ∀’ and the ‘∀ > OR’ reading for the
sentence every girl ate an apple, a banana, or a peach, and their uneasiness with
(45b) seems due to the availability of the ‘OR > ∀’ reading, which is false under the
given context. The consensus is that (45c) is the best short answer here, suggesting
that for a pair-list wh-question, its short answer should denote a range of possible
values in a rather general way and somehow overlook details.10
9 The sentences Lucinda is taller than every boy is and Lucinda’s height exceeds every boy’s (height)
have the same meaning, so one might be wondering whether the semantics of the than-clause in (43a)
and the relational DP every boy’s height are also equivalent. However, in the sentence Lucinda knows
every boy’s height, it is evident that the DP every boy’s height serves as the propositional argument of
know and cannot be replaced by an interval, suggesting that the semantics of a relational DP and the
short answer to a wh-question are not exactly the same. It seems that the semantics of a relational DP
might be flexible between a propositional answer and a short answer. (See also Barker 2016 for a
more detailed discussion on the semantics of relational DPs.)
10 See Zhang In prep. for more discussion on the notion of convex sets in answerhood.
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(45) CONTEXT: Mary ate an apple; Sue ate a banana; Kate ate a peach.
QUESTION: What did every girl eat?
a. # An apple, a banana, and a peach. # A sum of entities
b. % An apple, a banana, or a peach.
c. X A piece of fruit. X A range of possible values
Therefore, similarly, for comparatives like Lucinda is taller than every boy is,
the than-clause should also denote a range of degrees, not a sum of degrees (see
(46), cf. Beck 2014; Dotlacˇil & Nouwen 2016). Moreover, as we have proposed, a
than-clause should denote an interval, i.e., a convex set, which means that details
between its endpoints should be overlooked and not affect further derivation.
(46) CONTEXT: John is 6′ tall. Bill is 6′2′′ tall. Fred is 6′5′′ tall.
QUESTION: How tall is every boy? (Lucinda is taller than every boy is.)
a. At least 6′: [6′,+∞) A less informative interval
b. Between 6′ and 6′5′′: [6′,6′5′′] The most informative interval
c. #6′, 6′2′′, and 6′5′′. # A sum of degrees
In sum, we have shown that a than-clause can be considered a short answer to its
corresponding wh-question, and it denotes a convex set. This has two consequences.
First, analyzing the semantics of a than-clause as a convex set provides further
support for our interval-arithmetic-based recipe in which only the endpoints of the
comparative standard matter for computing the meaning of a comparative sentence.
Second, a than-clause, as a short answer to a wh-question, should inherit relevant
properties of the answerhood for this wh-question.
4.3 Mention-some vs. mention-all answerhood
Here we show why and how the use of existential priority modals in wh-questions
gives rise to ‘mention-some/mention-all’ ambiguity for answerhood.
Usually, we ask questions to seek information, and a good answer should be
complete and truthful. For example, in (47), under the given context, (47a) is
infelicitous, and the short answers (47b-i) and (47b-iii) are either misleading or not
informative enough, suggesting that a complete answer should be a mention-all
answer, i.e., a good short answer is unique and includes all entities such that applying
the function ‘λx.x came to the party’ to each of them results in a true proposition.
(47) CONTEXT: There are three people under discussion: John, Mary, and Bill.
John and Mary came to the party; Bill didn’t. Sue only knows that John
came to the party but has no information about Mary or Bill.
a. # Sue knows who came to the party.
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b. [[Who came to the party?]] = λx.x came to the party11
(i) # John. Incomplete; misleading
(ii) X John and Mary. Complete: a mention-all answer
(iii) # John or Mary. Not informative enough
In contrast, the use of an existential priority modal licenses mention-some
answers. Under the given context, (48a) is felicitous, and all the short answers in
(48b) are good, suggesting that here mention-some and mention-all answers are all
qualified as complete. Moreover, as shown in (48b-ii) and (48b-iii), in this case,
there are two forms for mention-all answers: conjunctive and disjunctive.
(48) CONTEXT: There are three places to get gas in Cambridge: X, Y, and Z.
Kim only knows about X but has no idea about Y or Z.
a. X Kim knows where we can get gas in Cambridge.
b. [[Where can we get gas?]] = λx.3 we get gas at x
(i) X X XMention-some answer
(ii) X X, Y, and Z X Conjunctive mention-all answer
(iii) X X, Y, or Z X Disjunctive mention-all answer
To account for the availability of mention-some answers for questions containing
an existential modal (3-question), Fox (2013, 2016) and Xiang (2016) have proposed
a structural account based on the notion of max-informativeness (see (49)): a
complete answer is defined as a max-informative answer, and max-informative
answer(s) cannot be asymmetrically entailed by any member in the answer space.
(49) Given a set of propositions α , the set of its max-informative members is:
{p|p ∈ α ∧∀q[q ∈ α → q 6⊂ p]}.
The basic idea is that there is a covert distributivity operator, and the scopal
interaction between this distributivity operator and the modal 3 generates different
answer spaces. (i) When DIST takes wider scope (see (50a)), the answer space is
closed under conjunction, and there is a unique true and max-informative proposition,
which is the mention-all answer. (ii) When 3 takes wider scope (see (50b)), the
answer space is not closed under conjunction, and therefore, both 3p and 3q are
max-informative (i.e., complete) and thus they are good mention-some answers.
(50) Assume that p and q are semantically independent and non-contradictory
(α and β are Hamblin sets; untruthful propositions are crossed out),
11 Sometimes, it seems that we can provide a for-example answer for questions like (47b), so some
approaches to the mention-some answer are based on pragmatic factors (e.g., van Rooij 2008).
However, given the distribution of the mention-some reading (especially in embedded questions), it
is evident that there should be some grammatical or structural constraints (see Xiang 2016).
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a. DIST >3: α = {3p,3q,3p∧3q} closed under ∧
b. 3> DIST: β = {3p,3q,3(p∧q)} not closed under ∧
Without going into technical details, there is a crucial problem for this approach.
The reasoning underlying this max-informative approach should work in the same
way for all existential modals, predicting that all 3-questions license mention-
some answers (even when they are embedded questions), but as (51) shows, an
existential epistemic modal (here might) does not license mention-some answers at
all (see Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984; Dayal 2016). Therefore, the upshot here is
that existential priority modals, or permission-related modals, are special. A good
account for the ‘mention-some/mention-all’ ambiguity should be based on this.
(51) CONTEXT: There are three people under discussion: John, Mary, and Bill.
John and Mary might come to the party; Bill won’t. Sue only knows about
John’s potential availability but has no idea about Mary or Bill.
a. #Sue knows who might come to the party.
b. – Who might come to the party? – # John.
Here we propose to follow Ross (1944) and Barker (2016) and adopt the idea
that the logic of obligation and permission behaves dramatically different from other
sorts of ordinary reasoning in being resource-sensitive. Roughly speaking, when we
use wh-questions with existential priority modals, the main purpose is not to seek
information, but to seek permission (or more generally, resource). Information
seeking and resource seeking follow different principles.
For information seeking, we naturally consider information immaterial and
eternal, and thus, we intuitively feel that the more information, the better, and it
is reasonable to assume that the answerhood for information-seeking questions is
based on the principle of max-informativeness.
However, resource should be considered consumable, and thus not only what
kind of resource matters (e.g., whether A is permitted or B is permitted), but also
how much resource matters (e.g., whether there are two permissions A and B that
can be used in a cumulative way or just one permission, say one of A and B).
Therefore, a complete answer for resource-seeking questions should grant enough
permission, and max-informativeness does not matter so much here.
Following Lokhorst (1997) and Barker (2010), we adopt Girard’s (1987) Linear
Logic, which is a resource-sensitive logic, to explain how in the case of (48), for
the question where can we get gas, both the disjunctive answer X, Y, or Z and the
mention-some answer X grant enough permission and are complete answers.
Within Girard’s Linear Logic, there are two connectives for conjunction – &
and ⊗ – and two for disjunction – ⊕ and &. & and ⊕ are additive operators, while
⊗ and &are multiplicative operators. ( means linear implication.
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Here is an example illustrating the difference between additive and multiplicative
conjunction. The additive conjunction of Linear Logic works in the same way as
the conjunction of classical logic, and thus, from A( B and A(C, it follows that
A( B&C. However, A( B⊗C does not follow here, but A⊗A( B⊗C follows.
The intuition is that if you have $1, you can get a beer, and you can get a coke, so
you have two options, but you cannot get both. To get both, you need to have $2. So
A( B&C actually means ‘if A then B else C’.
Apparently, it seems that additive conjunction & has some kind of disjunctive
flavor, but additive conjunction & is different from additive disjunction ⊕. In the
case of A( B&C, you can decide whether to get a beer or a coke, but in the case of
A( B⊕C, it is not up to you to decide. In other words, ⊕ is a free choice or.
One more element needed is how to express permissions within Linear Logic. We
analyze allowed as a strong permission: if A is allowed, not only A is not forbidden,
but also the permission of A is explicitly granted. We follow Lokhorst (1997) and
Barker (2010) and write A is allowed as A( δ , meaning ‘it is OK if we do A’.
Now we assume that in permission-related sentences, natural language or means
additive disjunction. Therefore, as shown in (52),12 using either the disjunctive
form A⊕B (see (52b)) or a mention-some answer like A (see (52c)) grants enough
permission for taking actions (e.g., choosing a place to get gas).
(52) a. (A⊕B)( δ ≡ (A( δ )&(B( δ )
i.e., if blindly doing anything indeterministic between A and B is OK,
then mindfully choosing A is OK, and mindfully choosing B is OK;
if mindfully choosing A is OK, and mindfully choosing B is OK, then
blindly doing anything indeterministic between A and B is OK.
b. (A⊕B)( δ ` (A&B)( δ
i.e., if blindly doing anything indeterministic between A and B is OK,
then mindfully choosing between A and B is OK.
c. A( δ ` (A&B)( δ
i.e., if doing A is OK, then mindfully choosing between A and B is OK.
Finally, in the example (48), we certainly do not need to go to all three places
to get gas, and thus for the conjunctive mention-all answer, we propose that this
conjunction takes wider scope. Therefore, the meanings of the three answers are
shown in (53), and they are all complete answers for a resource-seeking question.
(53) a. X X( δ
b. X, Y, and Z (X( δ ) & (Y( δ ) & (Z( δ )
c. X, Y, or Z (X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z)( δ
12 An online Linear Logic Prover is available here: http://bach.istc.kobe-u.ac.jp/llprover/.
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5 Deriving the ambiguity of the Lucinda sentence in (1)
The ambiguity of the Lucinda example follows naturally from our proposal.
First, the use of a permission-related existential modal in its than-clause leads to
short answers with mention-some (see (54a)) and mention-all (see (54b)) readings.
Then, these answers enter into the semantic mechanism of comparatives in a uniform
way, leading to a ‘< MAX’ and a ‘< MIN’ reading respectively.
(54) [[than allowed]] = the short answer to how fast is Lucinda allowed to drive
a. A mention-some answer: [50mph,50mph] ; ‘< MAX’ reading
(i) [[th(an) λ I. (Lu is) allowed (to drive I fast)]] = [50mph,50mph]
(ii) Speed(Lucinda)⊆ ιI[I− [50mph,50mph] = (−∞,0)]
⇔ Speed(Lucinda)⊆ (−∞,50mph)
b. Disjunctive mention-all answer: [35mph,50mph] ; ‘< MIN’reading
(i) [[th(an) λ I. (Lu is) allowed (to drive I fast)]] = [35mph,50mph]
(ii) Speed(Lucinda)⊆ ιI[I− [35mph,50mph] = (−∞,0)]
⇔ Speed(Lucinda)⊆ (−∞,35mph)
In fact, under the context in (1), the permission is also the obligation, i.e.,
Lucinda is required to drive between 35 and 50 mph. However, for wh-questions
with obligation-related modals, mention-some answers are unavailable: if a not-
so-precise range of values is required, no particular interval within it (i.e., a more
precise range) is required. The only exception comes with the lower bound of this
range (say 35 mph), which is the short answer when the question is interpreted in an
‘at least’ way (see (34b-ii)). This explains why comparatives with obligation-related
modals have a bias towards MIN-related readings and are less subject to ambiguity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attributed the ambiguity of comparatives like the Lucinda
example to the ‘mention-some/mention-all’ ambiguity in interpreting their than-
clause: the ultimate source of this ambiguity is the use of existential priority modals
in permission-seeking wh-questions. Overall, our account consists of: (i) an interval-
arithmetic-based semantics for unifying the contribution of maximum and minimum
values expressed by than-clauses, (ii) a short-answer-based view for connecting the
interpretation of than-clauses and the answerhood for corresponding wh-questions,
and (iii) a resource-sensitive account for the ambiguous answerhood rooted in the
use of permission-related existential modals. Each of these parts is independently
motivated, and our proposal suggests that richer logical systems and mathematical
tools enable us to have new insights into human language capacity. Technical details
and comparison with related work will be included in our future work.
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